What is packaging EPR?
Packaging Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) laws shift the cost of collecting, sorting and recycling packaging from municipalities to the companies that put that packaging into the market. The cost reaches those companies as a fee assessed on the total annual weight of packaging they supply into each state, priced by material. For obligated producers, it behaves as a variable cost: it scales with units sold and packaging weight per unit, not with revenue or profit.
Seven states have enacted packaging EPR laws: California, Colorado, Oregon, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota and Washington.1 Except for Maine, each program is run by a producer responsibility organization (PRO) called the Circular Action Alliance (CAA), which registers producers, collects their supply data, sets fees and funds the state's recycling system.2 The 24 founding members of the CAA include the world's largest retailers (Walmart, Target, Amazon), consumer products companies (P&G, MARS) and restaurant chains (McDonald's, Starbucks).3
Oregon began invoicing in 2025 and Colorado in January 2026; California collected its first supply reports in 2026 and it will issue its first invoices to producers in January 2027.4 The remaining states will come online through 2030.
How are material fees set?
The PRO calculates the rates on an annual basis in a fixed sequence:5
- 01State program budget. Start with the program's total annual cost: payments to local governments and recycling facilities, new collection and processing infrastructure, education, state oversight, operating reserves and PRO administration. The budget sits in a state-approved program plan informed by a statewide needs assessment. Budgets are set on a three to five year cadence, depending on the state.
- 02Allocate by material. Assign costs to each material category based on what it costs to collect, sort and market that material, net of the commodity revenue the material generates.
- 03Divide. Divide each category's net cost by the total tonnage all producers reported in that category. The result is a base rate per pound.
- 04Modulate. Adjust individual producers' rates up or down for packaging design features, such as recyclability or problem components (eco-modulation).
There are financial implications for anyone modeling a producer's exposure.
- EPR lifecycle. Each invoice is calculated on supply data producers have already filed, and the cycle spans three fiscal years: a company supplies packaging in year one, reports that supply the following spring, and is invoiced at the start of year three.
- Rate resets. Budgets are recalculated annually as program costs, PRO overhead and reported tonnage change. Program budgets for California, Oregon and Colorado will grow as collection and processing infrastructure is built out, and four more states come online through 2030. Therefore, a producer's exposure expands on two axes at once: rate per pound and number of states billing.
- Late and non-compliance. Producers that register or report late remain liable for their obligations, and state penalties apply on top. California's statute allows penalties of up to $50,000 per day, and most enacted states prohibit the sale or distribution of covered products by producers that are not participating in an approved program.6
Unlike Colorado and Oregon, California adds charges on top of the base fee that apply only to plastic and are assessed on different bases. As proposed in CAA's California program plan:7
- Plastic Pollution Mitigation Fund (PPMF) fee. An aggregated, fixed annual amount set in statute and remitted to the state.8 Fees are assessed on both weight and component count of plastic materials.
- Reuse Investment Fee. Funds the program's source reduction and reuse/refill obligations, allocated across reported plastic component weight.
- Source reduction bonus/malus. Producers that reduce plastic supply or increase certified recycled content earn bonuses, financed by maluses spread across all plastic producers.9
None of the three is part of the base-fee calculation. The PPMF is a regulatory charge unrelated to the cost of managing plastic; the other two fund policy objectives.
Who pays?
The PRO bills the "producer," a statutory term that does not always mean the manufacturer, the seller or the operator. Each state defines a hierarchy, and the first party that fits is obligated. The broad pattern runs from brand owner (in some states, the manufacturer selling under its own brand comes first), to licensee, to importer of record when the brand owner has no U.S. presence, to first distributor when no one above applies.10
Three provisions matter most to consumer analysts:11
- Franchises. Several states expressly make the franchisor the producer for packaging used by in-state franchisees. The franchisee operating the unit is not.
- E-commerce. In several states, an online order is split in two. The packaging around the item (the box, bottle or pouch it sits in on a shelf) follows the item's producer. The shipping box or mailer belongs to whoever packs the order for delivery. Depending on the fulfillment model, that can be the brand itself, a retailer or marketplace fulfilling the order from its own warehouse, or a manufacturer shipping direct to the consumer.
- Contractual assignment. Some states let a producer assign its obligation by contract to another party that joins the PRO in its place. The obligation can move; it cannot disappear.
De minimis thresholds exempt the smallest producers,12 and the scope of business-to-business and transport packaging differs by state. "Branded packaging follows the brand owner" is a reliable heuristic, not a rule.
| Package | Producer of record |
|---|---|
| Branded cup at a franchised QSR unit | The franchisor, not the franchisee operating the unit |
| Store-brand cereal box | The retailer, as brand owner, unless assigned to the co-manufacturer by contract |
| Imported apparel shipped direct to consumer | Brand owner (importer of record if no U.S. presence) for product packaging; whoever packs the order for the mailer |
How exposed are producers?
The fee scales with packaging weight and material; revenue scales with price, units and business model. Exposure therefore varies widely across companies facing identical rates. Six variables drive it:
- Price point. The fee is charged per pound of packaging; revenue is earned per unit sold. The same rate is immaterial on a product that sells for many dollars per pound of packaging and material on one that sells for cents. Low-price, packaging-heavy goods (bottled water, foodservice cups and containers, commodity staples) are most exposed; electronics, beauty and premium apparel least.
- Branding. The name on the package determines who is billed. In retail, the retailer pays on its house brands and national-brand manufacturers pay on theirs. In manufacturing, a co-manufacturer producing another company's brand is generally not the producer; a manufacturer selling under its own brand is. In foodservice, branded packaging is billed to the brand (the franchisor, in a franchise system).
- Revenue base. Some business models pay on a volume base larger than the revenue they report. A franchisor pays on system-wide packaging volume regardless of corporate vs. franchisee mix. A retailer pays only on its house brands, concentrating the fee on that share of sales.
- Packaging materials. Rates are set per material category, not per pound of packaging generally. Materials that are costly to collect and sort, or have weak end markets, carry higher rates. A polycoated paper cup and a plain corrugated box are both "paper" but are priced differently. In California, plastic also carries the PPMF, Reuse Investment Fee and malus; paper does not.
- Footprint. Exposure scales with the share of units sold into the seven enacted states. A brand concentrated in California or the West carries more exposure as a share of revenue than a national brand with identical packaging, whose sales are spread across states without EPR.
- Sales channels and contracts. These determine whether the fee can be passed through, not how large it is. Brands selling direct to consumers control price. Brands selling through large retailers negotiate cost increases at line reviews. Franchisors depend on what their agreements permit, and foodservice suppliers on their contract terms. See Cost mitigation strategies.
Based on the above factors, exposure will vary from sector to sector.
| Sector | Producer of record | Fee intensity driver | Pass-through and friction | Watch item |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| QSR / franchise | Franchisor for branded packaging | Foodservice paper and plastic; high volume, low price | Franchise agreements may bar new charges; supply-chain recovery varies | System-wide volume vs. royalty revenue base |
| Branded CPG (food, bev., HPC) | Brand owner or licensee | Packaging weight per revenue dollar; plastic share in California | Price, but big-box customers resist cost-driven increases | Eco-modulation on hard-to-recycle features |
| Grocery / private label | Retailer, as brand owner of own brands | Private-label share; low-price staples in heavy packaging | Shelf price or co-manufacturer contracts; assignment where permitted | Fee lands on own-brand margin only |
| Proteins | Brand owner; processor or distributor for unbranded | Films and trays; low value density at the commodity end | Contract pricing with retail and foodservice customers | Unbranded and private-label volume shifting obligation upstream |
| Beverage | Brand owner; bottler where licensed | Container weight per dollar; glass is heavy | Price; interaction with deposit programs | Deposit containers excluded in CA, OR, ME; covered in the other four13 |
| Apparel / footwear | Brand owner or importer; order packer for mailers | Polybags, mailers, hangtags; high value density otherwise | DTC pricing flexible; wholesale accounts resist | California textile EPR adds a product-level program14 |
| Electronics / beauty | Brand owner; importer if no U.S. presence | Low: high price per pound of packaging | Most absorbable; price points mask the cost | Separate product EPR; multi-material beauty components15 |
Cost mitigation strategies
Packaging changes may reduce the financial obligations vs. the status quo; however, producers cannot engineer their obligations to zero. Therefore, producers can look to shift the obligation through customer pricing or other supply chain mechanisms.
| Strategy | Where the cost ends up |
|---|---|
| Price | With the end customer, through list or shelf price |
| Supply chain | Embedded in the price of goods sold to franchisees, retailers or other downstream partners, where the producer controls a supply or distribution arm |
| Contract | Recharged or reassigned under a franchise agreement, customer contract or supplier agreement, including formal assignment of producer status where permitted |
| Absorb | In the producer's own margin |
Which branch is available depends on the channel:
- Direct-to-consumer and e-commerce: easiest to achieve. The brand controls price and presentation.
- Wholesale to large retailers: difficult to achieve. Cost-driven increases are negotiated at line reviews, and the retailer is itself a producer paying fees on its own brands.
- Franchise systems: agreement-dependent. New charges to franchisees may not be permitted outside existing fee structures until renewal. Where pass-through is permitted, the cost moves to unit-level margin.
- Foodservice and B2B contracts: cost-plus and index contracts can pass through; fixed-price contracts delay it until repricing.
Questions to ask management
- Where will packaging EPR fees sit in the P&L, and in which period are they recognized?
- Which mitigation tactics are you using to manage these new costs, and do your franchise, customer and supplier contracts permit them?
- How are California's "source reduction" mandates for plastic materials impacting your supply chain?
- If any obligated entity is not yet registered, how is the company assessing its exposure to back fees and penalties?
About this paper
This paper is built entirely from public sources: state statutes and regulations, state-approved program plans and CAA filings. It contains no client data and no material non-public information. It describes mechanism only and makes no rate forecast.
The Swedesford Group is an independent packaging EPR research and advisory firm. We build multi-state packaging supply reports and fee liability models for national consumer companies, with engagements across restaurants, packaged foods, proteins, automotive aftermarket and retail private label. Our first multi-state fee analysis was published in March 2026.
How to cite: Carroll, P. "Packaging EPR: A Financial Explainer." The Swedesford Group, September 2026.
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- Cal. Pub. Res. Code §42040 et seq. (SB 54, 2022); Colo. Rev. Stat. §25-17-701 et seq. (HB22-1355, 2022); Or. Rev. Stat. §459A.860 et seq. (SB 582, 2021); 38 M.R.S. §2146 (LD 1541, 2021); Md. SB 222 (2023) and SB 901 (2025); Minn. Stat. §§115A.144 to 115A.1463 (2024); Wash. E2SSB 5284 (2025).
- Maine's program will be run by a stewardship organization under contract with the Maine Department of Environmental Protection, which issued its request for proposals in June 2026. §10. Colorado also has a second approved PRO for lubricant packaging.
- Circular Action Alliance, founding members (circularactionalliance.org).
- CAA Oregon Program Plan (2025); CAA Colorado Final Program Plan 2026 to 2030; CAA California EPR Program Plan (revised June 18, 2026), §9.6.
- Condensed from CAA's six-step dues-setting methodology (CAA Colorado Final Program Plan 2026 to 2030; CAA Oregon Program Plan, 2025). Current plan periods: Oregon 2025 to 2027; Colorado 2026 to 2030. Minnesota's statute codifies the same logic: fees must reflect each material's program costs net of commodity value, plus allocated fixed costs, PRO operating costs and reserves. Minn. Stat. §115A.1454, subd. 1.
- Cal. Pub. Res. Code §42081. Penalty structures vary: Minnesota allows up to $25,000 per day, rising to $100,000 per day for a third violation within five years (Minn. Stat. §115A.1462); Washington allows up to $10,000 per violation per day for repeat violations and prohibits the sale or distribution of covered materials of non-participating producers (E2SSB 5284, §123).
- CAA California, EPR Program Plan (revised June 18, 2026), §§6.3, 8.4.16 and 9.7. Structures are as proposed and subject to CalRecycle approval.
- SB 54 sets the PPMF at $5 billion over ten years ($500 million per year) and permits resin manufacturers to contribute up to $150 million per year.
- CAA California, EPR Program Plan (revised June 18, 2026), §6.3.2. Final 2027 bonus and malus rates are published alongside the fee schedule in October 2026 (§6.3.3).
- Illustrative hierarchy based on Minn. Stat. §115A.1441, subd. 26 and Wash. E2SSB 5284 (2025), §2. Order and wording vary by state.
- Franchisor language: Minn. Stat. §115A.1441, subd. 26; Wash. E2SSB 5284 (2025), §2; Maine DEP packaging rules, §2(W). E-commerce shipping packaging and contractual assignment: Minnesota and Washington, same sections.
- For example, California exempts producers with less than $1 million in gross sales from reporting, though they must still register. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §42060(a)(5).
- California excludes containers subject to its CRV deposit program (Cal. Pub. Res. Code §42041(e)(2)); Oregon and Maine exclude containers covered by their bottle bills. Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota and Washington have no deposit system, so beverage packaging is covered; Minnesota and Washington direct that any future deposit system be harmonized with EPR (Minn. Stat. §115A.1461; E2SSB 5284, §125).
- California's Responsible Textile Recovery Act (SB 707, 2024) creates a separate product-level EPR program for apparel, footwear and household textiles, run by a different PRO (Landbell USA). Full implementation is scheduled for later this decade.
- Device and battery packaging falls under packaging EPR; the devices and batteries themselves fall under separate product programs in many states. Multi-material components such as pumps are common eco-modulation targets.